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2“Risky Business”
Space launch systems are inherently risky 
endeavors
– It takes a tremendous amount of energy to get to orbit
– Highly energetic systems must be designed, 
manufactured, assembled, and operated
– Launch environments are harsh
– Desire for high-performance often results in very 
complex designs with low margins
– Production rates are relatively low, yet often complex
The launch vehicle’s basic mission is to deliver 
people and/or high dollar investments to orbit
– The consequences of failure are significant 
3Managing Risks
Managing a “risky business” warrants careful 
attention to:
– identifying and characterizing risks
– mitigating risks to “acceptable levels”
– verifying the desired mitigations are in place
– monitoring performance to assure mitigations 
perform as expected over time
“Risk comes from not knowing what you`re doing.” 
Warren Buffett 1930- , American Investment Entrepreneur
4“Know Your Risks”
• Identifying and characterizing the safety 
and mission success risks associated with 
a space launch system is no simple task.
• There are many sources of these risks, 
spanning from:
– the harsh environments they operate in
– design complexities driven by needs for high-
performance
– complex interactions within the system and its 
external interfaces
– hardware failure mechanisms
– reliance on software to fly the vehicle
– low manufacturing production rates coupled with 
the need for high-quality products 
5Tools Used to Help Identify and Mitigate Risks 
• There are many sources of safety & mission success risks
– How can we assure they are identified in a timely manner, mitigated to 
“acceptable levels”….and assure that the mitigations are satisfactorily 
incorporated into the design and into the production of each flight unit?
• Use tools that can help:
– assure that risks are systematically identified throughout the life cycle
– provide a means to allocate risk mitigations to the design, 
manufacturing, assembly, transportation, and operations
– provide a means to verify that these risk mitigations are in place
– characterize and allow formal acceptance of residual risks
• The primary tools that have been used to accomplish this 
objective are Hazard Analysis and FMEA/CIL
– Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA)
6Hazard Analysis
• Hazard Analysis (HA) is a “top down,” systematic, qualitative 
safety risk assessment  tool. 
– MSFC has historically used a Fault Tree Analysis to drive its Hazard 
Analysis
– Causes which could lead to this undesired end state are identified   
– Controls and verification requirements are identified
– A “qualitative risk assessment” is performed (using the Program’s Risk 
Matrix) to characterize each cause’s residual risk
– All of the above are captured in Hazard Reports, which allows formal 
communication and acceptance of risks
7Failure Modes and Effects Analysis (FMEA)
• Failure Modes & Effects Analysis (FMEA) is used to identify and 
document the credible failure modes and causes of each hardware 
item of a system.  
• “Bottoms-up” analysis, which begins with the component/item and 
analyzes all possible failure modes and their associated effects that 
result on the function, system, crew, and vehicle.
• A FMEA also documents the worst-case effect of failures for each 
mission phase and assigns a “criticality” per the applicable Program’s 
FMEA/CIL methodology.
8Critical Items List (CIL)
• A CIL is created for “critical” failure modes which were identified by the 
FMEA
• Failure modes which could result in loss of life, loss of the vehicle, or 
the mission.
• CIL “Retention Rationale” is developed and documented for the CIL’s 
failure causes in order to reduce the likelihood of critical failure mode 
occurrence by means of applying design controls, inspections, and tests.
9SLS Innovation
• In-line Assessment (ILA) and Risk Based Approach (RBA)
• ILA and RBA are a MSFC S&MA Innovation to government quality 
assurance processes, helping to streamline the process without loss 
of technical rigor.
• ILA and RBA utilize MSFC lessons learned from the Shuttle and 
ARES programs.
-- ILA differs from Government Mandatory Inspection (GMI).  Assurance of a single     
process versus a single inspection point. 
• More effective QA of critical and complex processes.
• QA personnel embedded with team – no waiting for a S&MA rep
• Innovative use of electronic databases and communication links to report and 
correct issues.
• ILA – varying frequency / sampling - not mandatory
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ILA and RBA 
– RBA (Risk Based Assessment) – differs from previous (“one size 
fits all”) QA verification strategies.  Determines most appropriate 
government inspections method (GMI vs. ILA)  - uses technical and 
quality risk based screening questions and common risk ranking.
• Identifies fabrication/assembly and inspection processes with greatest safety and 
quality risk.
• More selective use of GMI and accomplish more efficiently
• Identifies those safety/mission critical inspections for ILA.
• Identifies, characterizes, and communicates quality assurance risks in a common 
manner across all SLS Elements.
– Pilot Results – demonstrate concept and effectiveness:
• Much more effective use of Government QA personnel-engaged and contributing.
• Reduces impact to contractor production schedules.
• Positive feedback from Contractors
• Solids:  Pilot on test motors (DM2, DM3, QM1), now operational (TVC and other 
refurbishment processes)
• Liquids:  Multiple supplier components assessed including liner welds and valves.
• Other SLS Elements engaged in implementing.
– Commercial Crew (and others) S&MA assessing use of ILA and 
RBA.  
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People
• People are your most Important Resource to 
assure Flight Safety And Mission Success. Value 
them.
• Open Communication Should Be the Standard 
that is embraced by the Highest Management to 
the Line Supervisor. Never tolerate Retribution for 
Speaking Up. If the King Has No Clothes, Tell Him.
• Beware of Normalization of Deviance.
• Be Willing to Make a Decision.
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FLIGHT RATIONALE
• All Flight Rationale Should Contain These 
Elements (Pocketing)
• Solid Technical Understanding
• Condition Relative to Experience Base
• Bounding Case Established
• Self-Limiting Aspect
• Margins Understood
• Assessment Based on Data, Testing, and Analysis
• Interactions with Other Elements/Conditions Addressed
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Stay Humble – You are never as smart as you think you are
• Invest early in good, multi-disciplined, structured 
brainstorming about possible failure modes for each 
component. (FMEA/CIL and Hazards Analysis are great, established 
tools for doing this!) It will pay off.
• Launch vehicles operate on the edge of technical 
feasibility and in a regime frequently beyond your 
engineering intuition.  Pocketing
• Margin and fault tolerance are essential when you design 
on the edge.
• Test what you fly and fly what you test.  Test at the corners of 
the Box. (Challenger)
• Resist Cutting Test Because of Budget Issues.
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Communications and Making Good Decisions
• Always seek out dissenting opinions. Beware of Group 
Think.
• Listen to your hardware.  It is always talking to you.  (External 
Tank ( Inter tank Popcorn)
• Major decision meetings (Flight Readiness Reviews, Critical 
Design Reviews) need to be held face-to-face. 
• Reward people for speaking up.
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Communications and Making Good Decisions
• All Models are Wrong, Some are useful.Challenge analyses, especially
from models that are not anchored with actual empirical data.  Have a 
good understanding of the assumptions in the models. 
• Listen with an open mind.  When you focus on the end answer, you 
tend to hear things only with an ear to confirm what you want that end 
answer to be (Confirmation bias).
• Cheating Gravity is hard to do.  You do the best you can and make the 
best decisions that you possibly can, and sometimes you’ll be wrong.  
Margin and fault tolerance.  (STS-78 PSA)
• It is always better to determine the condition of a suspect component 
(via direct measurement or observation) than it is to infer its condition via 
indirect measurement or observation or, worse yet, analysis. (Columbia 
wing on-orbit)
17
Communications and Making Good Decisions
• Both Columbia and Challenger were brought down by 
known problems that were being managed, not by 
somebody missing something or some new failure mode.  
You must critically challenge MRs, problem reports, etc., 
and get them right! 
• Guard against compartmentalization.  Don’t be a 
bystander and assume that somebody else who knows a 
lot more about the subject isn’t worried about the question in 
your mind. Sometimes the sponsors are engaging in wishful 
thinking.  Be courageous and ask what you think is the 
obvious question. Don’t Check Your Brain at the Door.
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Communications and Making Good Decisions
• When a technical matter is presented to you for decision, 
play it back to presenters in your own words.
• Risk tolerance goes way up as a deadline or milestone 
approaches.  Guard against it.  Someone’s life may be 
depending on it.
• Know your team.  Be there for them.  Things at home affect 
how decisions are made.
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Communications and Making Good Decisions
• You’re never as smart as you think you are.  If a team member 
(analyst, subsystem manager, chief engineer, etc.) habitually 
comes across as dead sure on technical matters, then they 
haven’t learned this lesson yet. (Nozzle Pocketing)
• Cost and schedule pressures are always present and real, 
but don’t let them box you into thinking that stand-down is not a 
real option.  It is.  Don’t say, “Well, we have to do it this way or we 
can’t fly.”  Sometimes you indeed can’t fly.
• Make sure your team is willing to speak up and challenge 
technical presentations, no matter who is presenting.  Speaking 
up is tough.    (STS-112 FRR)
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